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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper presents first analysis of the concept of stranded assets in context of shipping. Stranded 
assets are assets that have suffered from abrupt loss of value due to inadequate understanding of 
externalities such as environmental and social risks. The subject of stranded assets has gained 
popularity in the last decade and has been used to understand the risks in energy markets especially 
those relating to fossil fuel assets. The paper presents the findings of a series of semi-structured 
interviews with the industry’s leading debt and equity financiers as well as a variety of financial 
intermediaries on the topics of energy efficiency, efficiency retrofits and stranded assets. The results 
show differentiation amongst financial actors and by entities that finance assets and those that 
finance balance sheets. Amongst debt players that finance assets, competitive advantage is a 
consistent rationale for the use of vessel efficiency information. Actors that view vessel efficiency as a 
competitive advantage typically either finance efficiency retrofits or have considered doing so. There 
is mixed awareness of stranded assets and perceptions of the risks they pose to vessel financiers. 
The case for the inclusion of vessel efficiency information in vessel financing decisions is building, yet 
further work is needed. While some financial actors connect efficiency-derived competitive advantage 
to financial risk mitigation, there is a strong case for broader consideration in the context of market 
cyclicality and the associated increase in probability of vessel stranding. Such considerations may 
also have a positive impact on operational cashflow and thus investment returns. This research 
concludes that, should this link be analogous to other industries, vessel efficiency may be a good 
determinant of the vulnerability of portfolios to climate constraints on the industry that force the 
stranding of some assets.  
 
Keywords:
 
Stranded assets, shipping, energy efficiency, banks 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
There is a significant disconnect between projected business-as-usual emissions from shipping and 
the sector-wide emissions reductions that would be necessary to contribute a global target of 1.5°C or 
2°C warming (Smith et al. 2015). Given this, it is necessary to understand the potential impacts of 
policy-induced stranded assets on shipping and ship finance. However, the concept of stranded 
assets is entirely new to shipping. This research builds on literature from other sectors to inform 
expert interviews and identify future work. Analogous to literature that has developed around stranded 
assets in the E&P (extraction and production) industry and coal-fired power generation, this research 
focuses on a potential link between vessel energy efficiency and financial risk to identify future scope 
for work on supply-side stranded assets in shipping.  
 
In the Copenhagen Accord (2009) and the Cancun Agreement (2010) governments agreed that 
emissions should be reduced to avoid a rise in global average temperature of more than 2°C above 
pre-industrial levels, with the possibility of revising this down to 1.5°C in the Paris COP21 (2015). The 
shipping and aviation sectors have been left to their respective UN designated bodies, the 
International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), on the 
subject of GHG’s. Smith et al. (2014) show that under currently implemented IMO policies, targeting 
supply side efficiency coupled with a backdrop rising demand (for container and bulk shipping under 
2°C scenarios), shipping’s GHG emissions are expected to rise three folds, with the best case 
scenario seeing a stabilisation of emissions by 2050 on 2012 levels. This growth of emissions is in 
stark contrast to that required if shipping’s emissions were to correspond to similar target that is being 
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promulgated by the UNFCCC and if shipping was to maintain a similar share of global anthropogenic 
CO2 emissions as it did in 2012 (i.e. 2-3% or around 1Gt CO2e per annum).  
 
Given that there is a disconnect between where the shipping industry’s emissions are heading and 
potential regulations that could come, any regulation that would put the shipping sector on a track to 
contributing emission reductions in line with the UNFCCC’s desire to limit warming to 2°C would have 
truly significant impacts on the industry and its assets (Jordan et al. 2015). One of these impacts will 
undoubtedly be the rendering of some vessels as stranded assets, which are “assets that have 
suffered from unanticipated or premature write-downs, devaluations or conversion to liabilities”
 
(Caldecott, Tilbury & Ma 2013, p. 2). Market, regulatory, or socio-political forces can also strand 
assets.  
 
It is financially prudent to investigate the potential impacts of stranded assets on portfolios because 
the policy sphere is publicly working towards GHG measures for the industry. In April 2015, the 
registry of the Republic of the Marshall Islands submitted a proposal to MEPC 68 to limit GHG 
emissions of the sector in line with a 1.5°C expected rise in global temperatures. While the proposal 
was unsuccessful, the present negotiation text for the UNFCCC COP21 mandates that the 
International Maritime Organisation regulate GHG emissions. Furthermore, the European Union 
Monitor, Report, Verify (EU MRV) will come into effect in 2018, which will make operational emissions 
of all vessels in EU waters public for the first time, which may serve as the basis for a European 
shipping market-based measure (MBM).  
 
It is not the purpose of this research to discuss the materiality of such risks. Instead, this research 
draws from analogous literature in the E&P industry and coal-fired power generation to identify 
relevant interview foci for financial stakeholders and necessary future work.  These foci are the role of 
energy efficiency in vessel competitiveness, financial risk, and financial decision-making; involvement 
in efficiency retrofits; and perceptions of stranded assets. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Whilst the topics of stranded assets and stranded capital played significant roles in previous 
regulatory debates around the deregulation of the United States power generation sector in the 1990s 
(Caldecott & Mitchell), resurgence in its use has occurred since 2008. This primary focus of this 
literature is on coal, oil, and power generation assets. Because of the young age of this field, a 
significant amount of the literature is either grey or industry literature. This literature is reviewed, 
which is followed by relevant shipping-related academic literature. 
 
The most commonly-referenced stranded assets are arguably those pertaining to the ‘carbon bubble.’ 
In the 50% probability of staying below 2°C scenario, the cumulative CO2 emissions budget for the 
period 2011 to 2100 is estimated to be 1075 GtCO2 (Meinshausen, Wigley & Raper 2011). Today, 
there are an estimated 1541 GtCO2 of proven and probably reserves listed on global stock markets. 
Investors would be exposed to significant risks if policy aligned with a 2°C scenario (Carbon Tracker & 
Grantham Research Institute 2013). 
 
Alongside carbon bubble-focused literature, other stranded assets literature has developed to 
understand specific risks capable of asset stranding and to quantify these risks. Stranded assets are 
defined as “assets that have suffered from unanticipated or premature write-downs, devaluations or 
conversion to liabilities” (Caldecott, Tilbury & Ma 2013, p. 2). There are three categories of risks with 
potential to strand assets.  
 
First, market factors are risks to the economic viability of assets, such as the impact of burgeoning 
shale gas markets and increased competitiveness of renewables on coal-fired power generation in 
the United States (Caldecott, Tilbury & Ma 2013).  
 
Second, regulatory factors are risks that include direct carbon regulation, such as carbon taxes; 
indirect regulation, such as water use limitations (e.g. for coal power generation) and increased 
pollution controls; mandates for renewable energy and energy efficiency; and impending regulation, 
which creates long-term uncertainty, especially for capital-intensive assets (Generation Foundation 
2013). 
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Third, socio-political factors are risks that “evolving social norms and consumer behaviour” pose to 
asset owners or users (Caldecott, Tilbury & Ma 2013, p. p. 2). These risks, such as the fossil fuel 
divestment campaign, are typically reputational, not financial (Ansar, Caldecott & Tilbury 2013).  
 
Early literature focuses on the impact of hypothetical, strict climate policies on the cost 
competitiveness of extraction and production (E&P) companies’ oil reserves and coal miners’ coal 
production costs. “Coal and Carbon” (Robins, Keen & Knight 2012) and “Oil and Carbon” (HSBC 
Global Research 2008) use average break-even production costs for major E&P majors and the big 
four companies
1
, respectively. Spedding, Mehta & Robins (2013) vastly improve this methodology by 
creating crude production cost curves for E&P majors by aggregating their production costs at the 
project level. This is used to estimate the impact on market capitalisation of hypothetical low-demand 
scenarios.  
 
Redmond & Wilkins (2013) examine the impact of low-demand scenarios on traditional and non-
traditional North American E&P companies and find that “The financial models that use past 
performance and creditworthiness may be insufficient to guide investors looking to understand the 
possible effects of future carbon constraints on the oil sector” (Redmond & Wilkins 2013, p. 2). 
 
Caldecott & Mitchell (2014) analyse potential regulatory-driven financial risks to owners of subcritical
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coal-fired power stations in the United States and India. Their findings indicate that that in competitive 
markets, the potential for significant financial losses in the case of rapidly changing regulatory 
environments is significant and exacerbated by the ownership of relatively inefficient assets.  
 
The literature is now developing to focus on current risks and how those can be used to inform current 
investment portfolios while also being used as a proxy for future investment portfolio risks. Caldecott, 
Dericks & Mitchell (2015) identify significant financial risks through analysis of market forces as well 
as national and regional regulatory environments for subcritical coal-fired power stations in the seven 
largest national markets. They aggregate this data and rank asset owners by risk exposure. Key 
findings of this work are as follows. First, efficiency is likely to be a significant factor in financial risk 
and should be included in financial decision-making. Second, regulations or other factors that force 
asset owners to make large capital expenditures late in an asset’s useful life are key moments of 
asset stranding.  
 
Literature relevant to stranded assets in shipping is limited to that on market factors. Stopford (2009) 
characterises shipping as a highly cyclical industry, having undergone roughly 22 cycles since 1740. 
During market troughs, rates typically approach or undercut operational and voyage costs, which 
multiplies the financial advantages of vessel efficiency and leads to the acceleration of scrapping of 
inefficient vessels.  
 
The importance of efficiency in vessel competitiveness is evinced by current industry conditions. 
Since the market peak and corresponding fiscal crisis of 2007-2008, the industry has been forced to 
cope with a tremendous overcapacity of vessels as well as low rates (Reuters 2015). This has 
fostered the development of a two-tier market, in which more efficient vessels earn higher rates 
(Agnolucci, Smith & Rehmatulla 2014). Further evidence of the current importance of vessel efficiency 
includes the widespread practice of slow steaming to reduce voyage costs (Corbett, Wang & 
Winebrake 2009) 
 
Smith, Bracewell & Mulley (2015) identify other demand- and supply-side factors that could be drivers 
of asset stranding in shipping. In addition to vessel efficiency and market factors, other supply-side 
factors include vessel size, fuel-type, CO2 intensity, and other regulatory changes that could require 
high capital expenditure, such as SOx, NOx, or ballast water regulations. Demand-side factors are 
characterised mostly by changes in commodity demand. 
 
 
3. METHOD 
We employed the semi-structured interviews (Bryman 2008) to answer the above research questions 
in an inductive approach (de Vaus 1995) and to gain the respondents point of view. In total, eleven 
                                                     
1
 Big four companies refers to Anglo American, Rio Tinto, BHP Billiton, and Xstrata 
2
 Subcritical refers to a power station’s boiler type, with subcritical being the least efficient type.   
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semi-structured interviews were conducted with stakeholders from maritime finance community. 
These stakeholders included four representatives from three major European banks active in ship 
finance, two representatives of equity firms active in acquiring vessels and ship owning companies, 
one representative of a major classification society that has advised on the use of vessel efficiency in 
financial decision-making, three representatives of two UK-based shipbrokers, and three 
representatives of the shipping analyst team from a major credit rating agency. This research focused 
on bankers, financiers, and broader stakeholders because of the relevance of stranded assets to ship 
financiers and the necessity of understanding maritime financing decisions within the context of the 
financial community at large.  
 
The interviews focus on identifying the extent of use of vessel efficiency information in financial 
decision-making around the purchase of newbuild and second-hand vessels; the rationale for the 
inclusion/exclusion of vessel efficiency amongst financial actors; the extent of financial actors willing 
to finance efficiency retrofits; and industry perceptions of ‘stranded assets’ and the risks they pose to 
industry finance. A full list of questions and an index of interviews can be found in the appendix. 
 
 
4. FINDINGS 
With regard to the explicit use of vessel efficiency in financial decision-making, the results are as 
follows. Two of three banks explicitly include vessel efficiency in their assessment of lending 
decisions because of the financial benefits to their business. Banker 1 stated, “I can confirm that 
assets with higher energy efficiency have a higher likeliness that the loan will perform. We see this 
with certainty in our portfolio.” Despite this, banker 2 responded that his institution does not explicitly 
consider assets (vessels) when providing debt, but instead bases their balance sheet-based lending 
decisions on corporate reputation and credit. Financiers 1 and 2 (raise debt and equity for purchase of 
new and second-hand vessels) as well as ship brokers 1, 2 (chartering, newbuilding and second-hand 
brokers) and 3 (newbuilding broker) do not explicitly consider vessel efficiency in financing decisions 
but state that efficiency is priced by the market. The credit analysts do not consider vessel efficiency 
because they have not been shown that it has a significant impact on the profitability of shipowning 
companies.  
  
With regard to perceived financial benefits of efficient vessels, most interviewees saw financial benefit 
to financing or chartering more efficient vessels, except for banker 2 and the credit analysts. The 
financial benefits were perceived for both the sale and purchase market as well as the chartering 
market (time charter), although the full extent of the benefits were difficult to capture due to the 
qualitative nature of the methods and other markets such as the demolition markets were harder to 
elicit. In terms of the charter market all respondents unanimously felt that a two-tier market had 
formed, where there were clear differences between efficient ships and inefficient ships, although their 
respective financial rewards may not be so clear. Banker 2 stated that vessel efficiency was not 
applicable to his institution’s lending model. The credit analysts stated that there may be some 
financial advantages to efficient vessels but they are likely too small to consider. 
 
The broking firm of shipbrokers 1 and 2 has developed an internal analytical tool that uses operational 
data from approximately 80% of the bulk market (gathered directly from shipowners) to assess the 
competitiveness of ‘eco’ newbuilds against less-efficient pre-EEDI vessels. While it is not used in 
decision-making and while the researchers could not have access to the tool to verify their claims, 
their initial findings, which were presented to the authors, suggest that efficient vessels are more 
competitive throughout a wide range of market scenarios.  
 
With regard to financing efficiency retrofits, bankers 1, 3, and 4, who representing two of three banks, 
said that their institutions had financed fleet-wide efficiency retrofits. Financier 1 stated that he was 
considering financing efficiency retrofits, while financier 2 had financed smaller retrofits to make 
vessels more employable. Bankers 1, 3, and 4 also stated that it offered a way to increase the 
competitiveness of vessels. Banker 1 stated that his institution also retrofitted vessels as a way to 
increase their employment prospects and reduce their burden of non-performing loans. When further 
questioned, all the bankers concurred that they would mainly consider fleet-wide retrofits and a large 
capital outlay due to the economies of scale or the financing costs involved. Banker 1 stated that they 
would only consider retrofit financing in the range of $30-40m and Banker 4 stated that the minimum 
retrofit finance package would have to be $25m for a single shipowner with no mortgage lien on the 
assets.  
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Before discussing the topic of ‘stranded assets’ with the researchers, only banker 3 and ship manager 
1 were familiar with the topic. Banker 3 had investigated the topic of stranded assets in other sectors 
but had not considered its relevance to shipping. Ship manger 1 had direct experience with stranded 
assets caused by the fiscal crisis 2007-2008. He said, “When working at [European shipowner], we 
went from 90 to 28 vessels and sold only 5-6 of those. The rest were scrapped because of major 
operational expenses.” 
 
Banker 2 was the only interviewee that found the topic of stranded assets irrelevant to his institution’s 
lending model, which is balance sheet, not asset-based. All other interviewees were aware of the 
stranded assets at least conceptually. After describing the concept to financier 1, he replied, “For 
example, German KGs. The money has been ripped out of them and paid back to shareholders. 
Some have been left without enough capital to operate.”   
 
On their perception of vessel values and energy efficiency, Banker 1 and 4 and Ship broker 1 and 2 
(though they don’t explicitly use vessel energy efficiency with the exception of Banker 1) use third 
parties/agents to value the vessel, which includes physical surveys. Further work could explore these 
agents/stakeholders (possibly independent surveyors and class societies) and their methods for 
evaluating energy efficiency and it’s relationship with overall vessel values.  
 
Banker 3 makes explicit use of the Rightship EVDI database to evaluate energy efficiency of vessels 
within their portfolio and Banker 1 has an in-house tool to evaluate the energy efficiency, which is 
applied to all ships, both existing and newbuilds, using the EEDI as a proxy for existing ships. All 
brokers mentioned that they use the speed and fuel consumption curve as the primary means to 
assess or compare the energy efficiency of ships. 
 
From the interviews it was clear that there were key investment parameters at play in the financial 
stakeholder’s decisions and perceptions of energy efficiency of ships. For example Banker 4 
reaffirmed the common perception that their typical financing term would be around 10-12 years and 
Financier 1 suggested a payback period of five years. Interestingly the banker that explicitly 
incorporates vessel efficiency suggested that when assessing investment in energy efficiency retrofits 
they do not explicitly use quantitative investment methods such as Net Present Value (NPV), Internal 
Rate of Return (IRR) nor payback, which are the most common methods employed with high 
stringency in shipping (Rehmatulla 2015) (Parker 2015) (HSH Nordbank 2014) (Lloyds List 2011). 
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The first significant finding of this research is the likely differentiation between asset and balance 
sheet financiers with regards to the inclusion of vessel efficiency information in financing decisions. 
While this research cannot draw a final conclusion on whether this holds true throughout the industry 
because of the limited number of banks interviewed, significant support for this notion was given in an 
interview with Class Representative 1. Having engaged directly with “many major shipping banks” on 
the use of vessel efficiency in financing decisions because of the impact of a two-tier market on 
vessel competitiveness, he had observed this distinction throughout the industry.  
 
If the interview with Banker 2 is remotely representative of the sentiment of other lenders that focus 
on balance sheets instead of assets, there is a need for further assessment of these lending policies 
as well as asset-focused lending policies that do not account for vessel efficiency. This is due to the 
potential vulnerability of these lending policies to market cyclicality through the finance of assets that 
are only competitive at peak market conditions. Evidence of this exists at banks such as HSH 
Nordbank, who are still dealing with over €6 billion toxic shipping assets,
3
 in part due to the use of the 
‘Hamburg formula’ for vessel valuation. This DCF-based technique tends towards the over-valuation 
of vessels in peak market conditions because it bases vessel value on projected future cashflow.
4
   
 
Whilst a range of policies may be necessary to protect against lending for vessels of limited 
competitiveness, the inclusion of vessel efficiency in asset finance decisions may be one effective 
method to reduce the vulnerability of asset portfolios to market cyclicality. 
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 Osler, David. “HSH rescue: Apocolypse Not Now.” Lloyd’s List 20 October 2015 
4
 Osler, David. “Surprise Reprieve for Hamburg Formula.” Lloyd’s List 27 October 2014 
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Both HSH Nordbank and KfW IPEX-Bank announced their use of EEDI-based tools for vessel finance 
decisions because of the increased competitiveness of efficient vessels in the two-tier market
5
. This 
sentiment was confirmed in interviews with Bankers 1, 3, and 4. Furthermore, Banker 1 confirmed that 
a historical analysis of their ship loan portfolio showed that vessels of higher efficiency have a higher 
likelihood that the loan will perform. 
 
The second significant finding of this research is that, outside of a simple profit motive, ship bankers 
and financiers hold two rationales for financing efficiency retrofits on vessels. The first is to increase 
the competitiveness of vessels already on the books of vessels’ financier. The second is to increase 
the attractiveness of inefficient vessels that have non-performing loans by retrofitting them.  
 
The significance of both rationales is that bankers and financiers interviewed have confidence in a 
market that rewards efficiency improvements on vessels. While this is the case, Bankers 1, 3, and 4 
each stipulated that there are constraints to their financing of retrofits to increase the competitiveness 
of vessels. The main constraint is that their minimum project sizes range between $25 - $30 million, 
which limits them to financing fleet-wide retrofits. The implication of this is that efficiency retrofits 
financed with bank debt are limited to fleet-scale retrofits. This effectively bars smaller shipowners 
from directly accessing bank debt for retrofits. However, companies such as EfficientShip Finance, a 
boutique investment firm that provides debt/equity for single ship retrofits with a minimum project size 
of $1 million, may be able to fill this financing gap if they are successful in operationalizing their 
financing models. 
 
In conclusion, while the concept of stranded assets is a conceptually new to shipping, ship finance 
institutions have first-hand experience with managing such assets post-fiscal crisis.  
 
There is a need for further work to quantitatively investigate the correlation between vessel efficiency 
with vessel employment, operation speed, vessel value, vessel life span, and charter rates. This work 
would provide support for the inclusion of vessel efficiency in financing decisions by building the case 
for the role of vessel efficiency in increasing portfolio returns and decreasing portfolio risk. 
 
There is a need for the combination of this further work with 2°C scenario analysis to determine 
whether shipping may be analogous to the E&P and coal-fired power generation industries, where 
efficiency is likely to be a key determinant of asset survival in a climate-constrained world.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Interview List:  
 
Interview Number Interviewee Relevance to Research 
1 Banker 1 Major European shipping bank  
2 Financier 1 
Botique firm that raises debt and equity for 
purchase of new and second-hand vessels. 
3 Banker 2 Major European shipping bank  
4 Class Representative 1 
Class society that has advised banks on 
vessel efficiency 
5 Shipbrokers 1 and 2 Broker of vessel sales and charters 
6 Ship Manager 1 
German equity-backed shipowner and 
charterer  
7 Banker 3 Major European shipping bank  
8 Banker 4 Major European shipping bank  
9 Credit Analysts Major credit rating agency 
10 Financier 2 
European equity firm that buys shipowning 
companies  
11 Shipbroker 3 
Brokers of sales and charters and shipping 
advisor to major British bank 
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Interview Questions: 
 
Who are you and what do you do in the shipping sector? 
 What is the size of your shipping portfolio? How does this compare with your total portfolio?  
 
If you are asked to provide a loan for the purchase of a second-hand vessel: 
 
 What is the general process from application for finance to approval of the loan? 
 What are the three most important factors that you consider when deciding whether or not to 
provide financing for a vessel?  
 What are typical interest rates on your loans? 
o Who would typically get a preferential cost of capital? 
 What investment criterion do you use to value a second-hand vessel? 
o Do you consider a vessel’s energy efficiency when valuing it? 
o Why or Why not? 
o What efficiency data do you use (i.e. In-house information or external sources such 
as EEDI, EVDI, EIV)?  
o How is it used?  
o What quality of information is necessary to use it in such decisions? 
 Do more efficient vessels obtain a premium over less efficient vessels in their market resale 
value?  
 Does energy efficiency play a role in the competitiveness of some vessels over others in the 
market? 
o How specifically?  
o Through impacting charter rates or employment rates? / Why not? 
o Do you track charter rates and the utilization (employment) rates of different vessels 
that you finance? 
 
 Do you finance or are you considering financing energy efficiency retrofits for vessels? 
o Why or why not? 
 Do you talk to owners about retrofits to increase the energy efficiency of vessels? 
o If so, what do you recommend to owners with regard to retrofits? 
o If you do finance energy efficiency retrofits, do you consider financing retrofits on 
ships that are not in your portfolio? 
o What investment criteria do you use, i.e., payback, NPV, IRR etc 
o If payback, what payback period do you require? 
 
Stranded Assets are defined as “assets that have suffered from unanticipated or premature write-
downs, devaluations or conversion to liabilities.”  
 
 Are you familiar with the concept of stranded assets? 
o Does your business consider stranded assets a risk factor?  
o Does your business consider regulations (such as efficiency or Sulfur regulations), 
changing social norms (such as labeling reporting of GHG emissions) or capable of 
stranding assets in your shipping portfolio? 
 Do you consider the energy efficiency of vessels a factor in stranded assets risk? 
o Please provide suggestions on how you would pre-emptively manage and monitor 
risk of stranded assets. 
o If energy efficiency were shown to be a significant factor in the operating cash flow 
and market value of vessels, what would be the most effective way to communicate 
that information to the ship finance community? 
 
Other industries, such as power generation, are currently managing significant stranded assets-
related write-downs and asset closures.   
 
 Would you find case studies of how these risks have been managed helpful? 
 If relevant to your business, how likely would the adoption of some risk-management 
practices be? 
Who else should I be talking to? 
